Vulnerability and robustness are major concerns for future power grids. Malicious attacks and extreme weather conditions have the potential to trigger multiple components outages, cascading failures and large blackouts. Robust contingency identification procedures are necessary to improve power grids resilience and identify critical scenarios. This paper proposes a framework for advanced uncertainty quantification and vulnerability assessment of power grids. The framework allows critical failure scenarios to be identified and overcomes the limitations of current approaches by explicitly considering aleatory and epistemic sources of uncertainty modelled using probability boxes. The different effects of stochastic fluctuation of the power demand, imprecision in power grid parameters and uncertainty in the selection of the vulnerability model have been quantified. Spectral graph metrics for vulnerability are computed using different weights and are compared to power-flow-based cascading indices in ranking N − 1 line failures and random N − k lines attacks. A rank correlation test is proposed for further comparison of the vulnerability metrics. The IEEE 24 nodes reliability test power network is selected as a representative case study and a detailed discussion of the results and findings is presented.
Introduction
The Power Grid is the world's largest, man-made interconnected structure and plays a critical role in the well-being of society. The working productivity, comfort and safety of local citizens relies on on power grids integrity and even modest power outages can seriously compromise their welfare. Severe black-5 outs may have a huge social and economic impact and is therefore necessary to develop resilient future power grids, capable of withstanding their occurrences. This requires vulnerability assessments of the electric power supply, the identification of critical scenarios, contingency plans and a high degree of confidence in the results. It is also necessary to better understand the relationship between power grids operational risks and those associated with a vulnerable topological structure. This will help mitigate the effects of unexpected and hazardous failures, and enhance the overall network robustness and resilience.
The structure and operations of power grids are changing radically [1] - [2] : 15 The growing share of intermittent and uncertain renewable power sources is making grid behaviour less predictable; climate change is predicted to increase the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events with the potential to deeply compromise grid integrity [3] ; and as highly meshed (non-radial) distribution grid topology is expected to become more common in the future [4] , it 20 is likely to see an increasing structural complexity and interconnection between the power grid components. Due to this scenario of increasing complexity and uncertainty, it is important to assess both the inherent variability in the system and imprecision affecting the network parameters. Topological and operational weaknesses have to be better understood in order to provide superior network 25 designs capable of promptly react to unexpected hazardous situations. One potential method of achieving higher grid resilience is by enhancing existing frameworks for power grid vulnerability assessment and by adopting sophisticated uncertainty quantification techniques. 30 The robustness of power networks is defined as the degree to which the grid is able to withstand unexpected events without degradation in performance [5] . A closely related concept is the vulnerability, which is generally regarded as the lack of robustness. Vulnerability metrics can be obtained in several ways and, in the literature, overload cascading indices based on power-flow evaluations 35 have been proposed to assess the effect of cascading failure events [6] - [7] . This approach has proven adequate in cases where the cascades are mainly driven by overload line trippings [7] . Alternative approaches have focused on the grid topology by using graph theory to analyse its structure [5]- [8] -[9]-[10]-[11]- [12] - [13] - [14] . The so-called pure topological analysis use unweighted adjacency ma- 40 trices to calculate vulnerability whilst extended topological approaches enrich the analysis by incorporating electrical engineering information in the weights of the graph. The extended metrics have been introduced based on the idea that pure topological approach may fail in exhaustive captivation of the electric network complexity. Whether or not pure topological approaches and their ex-transportation networks) to power grids. It was showed that some of the physical laws applied to power systems are limiting factors but, when graph-theory methods are applied, the computational cost of analysis is greatly reduced. P. Hines et al. [12] discussed the use of topological measures for power grid vulnerability analysis. Through the analysis of random failures it was argued that 70 topological measures can be useful as general trend indicators of vulnerability, although physical-based models (e.g. power flow models) are believed to be more realistic. S. LaRocca et al. [13] investigated different measures for power grids vulnerability and risk assessment by randomly removing grid components. Similarly, R. Rocchetta and E. Patelli [14] compared graph-theoretic spectral 75 vulnerability metrics to power flow based vulnerability metrics in ranking power grid most critical lines. They showed that load demand uncertainty and tolerance imprecision affect the results of the contingency ranking.
To the authors knowledge, none of the reviewed works analysed the effects of 80 both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty on the computation of graph-theoretic spectral vulnerability metrics. However, it is known that sources of uncertainty will inevitably affect power grids robustness. There are several representative examples which consider these effects in the power grid reliability assessment literature. Few notable approaches include reliability assessments of power grids 85 allocating renewable energy sources [19] , increasing interdependency between different networks (e.g. telecommunication network transportation network, etc.) and the inherent variability of the (changing) external environmental conditions [3] . Accounting for relevant sources of uncertainty affecting power grid robustness and vulnerability may help to improve the overall confidence in the 90 results and better identify critical scenarios. Being able to distinguish between the (inherently variable) aleatory component of the uncertainty and the (in principle) reducible epistemic uncertainty can be beneficial for the analysis and for improve confidence in the results. Furthermore, many vulnerability metrics have been proposed in the literature and the results will be inevitably affected 95 by a specific metric selection. It is therefore necessary to assess the level of uncertainty associated to power grid robustness when different metrics are employed for vulnerability analysis.
In this work, drops in performance due to single and multiple line failures are 100 analysed by employing algorithms developed by the authors. A novel weighting factor based on the line percentage of rating is also introduced and compared to weights applied in the literature. Load demand is inherently variable and the increasing allocation of non programmable renewable energy sources are making its behaviour even more uncertain. Thus, the aleatory and the epistemic 105 uncertainty affecting load demands and network parameters are accounted for and propagated to the vulnerability metrics and respective contributions highlighted. The proposed framework is flexible and can account for renewable energy sources uncertainty. This can be done by proposing a different characterisation of the uncertainty in the load. One of the main contributions of this 110 work is a systematic comparison of the vulnerability based on operational flowbased models and topological approaches (pure and extended). Furthermore, none of the reviewed works compared spectral vulnerability metrics for contingency ranking purposes embedding the methods within advanced uncertainty quantification framework. Thus, similarities and differences of the different met-115 rics are discussed for increasing damage size and accounting for uncertainties due to stochastic loads and line parameters imprecision.
The paper is structured as follows: A concise review on power grid modelling and spectral graph analysis is proposed in Section 2. In Section 3, vulnerability 120 metrics are defined. The uncertainty modelling and contingency analysis are described in Section 4. The developed algorithms and framework are summarised within Section 5. In Section 6 presents the analysis of the IEEE reliability test system. The limitation faced are discussed in Section 7 and in Section 8 conclusions are drawn. 
Background and Power Grid Modelling
A power network structure can be modelled using weighted or unweighted undirected graphs G = {N , L, w}, where N is the set of network buses (or nodes set), L is the set of lines connecting the nodes (i.e. links set) and w is the set of weights associated to the lines [10]- [20] - [21] - [22] . Generally when 130 graph-theory approaches are used, a conservative (pessimistic) hypotesis is made on the network structure, to ease the calculations. Self-loops such as parallel lines are removed from the graph G and replaced by the equivalent single line model. Different weights define different graph models of the power network, for instance, if w =1 the model and following analysis will be named purely topo-135 logical [15] , since no electrical quantities are employed. Alternatively, weights can be used to represent specific electrical engineering information. Quantities such as the line susceptance (B ij ) or power flow (f ij ) have been previously adopted as line weights, see e.g. [8] - [23] , where i and j represent the generic nodes. The number of buses and the number of branches in the power network 140 is represented by the cardinality of the node set N b = |N | and the cardinality of the line set N L = |L|, respectively. To simplify the notations the line subscript (ij) ∈ L can be replaced with the subscript l representing the line index.
Overflow Cascading Vulnerability
A 'cascade' is a sequential succession of dependent events [6] . In power systems cascading analysis a failure sequence (lines tripping) can be defined as load-driven when the thermal expansion results in the line dropping beneath its safety clearance, or load-independent such as in case of a mechanical failure. The metric adopted in this paper focuses on load-driven failures and is used to assess the network vulnerability to overload cascading events. The cascading index (CEI) is is obtained computing the 'immediate' post-contingency powerflow operative state and it is defined as follows [6] :
where P(C l |C N −k ) is the probability of a secondary (post-contingency) trip
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of the line (l) after the contingency denoted as C N −k occurred. The severity S l (C N −k ) is a overload severity function for the line l due to the occurrence of a single trip (k = 1) or multiple failures (k > 1).
Severity functions can be used to quantify the operational risk due to components failures [3] . The continuous severity function for overload is specifically defined for each circuit (lines and transformers). It measures the extent (severity) of failures in terms of line percentage of rating
. The quantity f emerg,l is the emergency rating of the line l ∈ L and is related to its thermal limit and f l is the power flow in the line. The expression for the continuous severity due to overload (S l ) of a line l is defined as follows [3] :
where S l is zero for values of the flow rating less than a safety limit P R min l =0.9. The deterministic limit for the violation of line l is P R l =1, the near violation region is 0.9≤ P R l <1, and the value P R l under 0.9 is regarded as safe, parameters of the severity model are d=10 and c=-9. Continuous severity functions provides non zero values for scenarios close to the performance limits, which reflects the realistic sense that close to failure scenarios have non-zero risk (but deterministically safe). The probability of cascading trip of line l after an initiating contingency C N −k occurs can be expressed as follows [6] :
where f l (C N −k ) is the flow on the line l after the contingency C N −k occurred,
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f trip,l is the flow leading to a certain trip of the line l (assumed to be 1.25 times its thermal limit [6] ) and f 0,l is the flow in the line l before contingency C N −k . The rationale underpinning Eq.3 is that higher load levels and larger transients increase the likelihood of the secondary contingency (i.e. cascading) on the line l after an initiating event C N −k . The probability P(C l |C N −k ) is set equal 1 for
The cascading index has indeed some limitations (i.e. the criteria for posttrip probability calculation is based on expert judgement and pre-contingency trip probabilities are neglected). Nevertheless, the computational time needed 160 for its calculation is very small (i.e. that of a single power flow calculation) and this makes it suitable for advanced frameworks for uncertainty quantification, which are generally computationally very demanding.
Spectral Graph Analysis for Power Grids
The topology of the graph G can be fully characterised by its adjacency matrix W . An adjacency matrix is a N × N symmetric matrix in which the non-null elements represent weights of existing lines connecting different nodes. In general, the weight are associated to some measure of interest or set equal to 1 (i.e. unweighted adjacency matrix). The matrix D is the diagonal matrix which contains information about the degrees of each node and its diagonal elements (d i ) are equal the sum of the weights of the lines connected to the node i. The Laplacian L of the matrix W is simply L = D − W and the elements can computed as follows [23] :
where the term N j w ij is the degree (d i ) of the node i.
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Spectral graph analysis has been recently used to assess power grids robustness [8] and to tackle islanding problems [23] - [24] . The eigen-proprieties of the adjacency matrix are obtained as follows:
Analogously, the spectrum of the network Laplacian is obtained as follows:
where Φ = [Φ 1 , .., Φ N ] is the set of eigenvectors, Λ is the set of eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix and Ψ is the set of eigenvalues of the Laplacian, such that
The eigenvalues of L are non-negative and the smallest (µ 1 ) is equal to 0. The multiplicity of µ 1 is equal to the number of connected components. If the graph is disconnected, µ 2 = 0 and at least two separate grids exist. Further details are going to be discussed in Section 3.
Vulnerability Metrics and Spectral Analysis for Power Networks
An N − k contingency is defined as the unexpected simultaneous loss of k components in the network [25] (e.g. lines, generators, transformers). Vulnerability indices can be used to quantify the reliability of power networks by assessing relative changes in performance metrics. The network vulnerability V(C N −k ) associated to the contingency (C N −k ) can be generally quantified as follows [15] :
where M(C N −k ) is a vulnerability metric after contingency C N −k and M is the metric value for the undamaged network.
Pure and Extended Spectral Vulnerability Metrics
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Power network structural vulnerability can be assessed by using pure or extended topological models of the grid. The first uses the unweighted adjacency matrix and lines are regarded as identical [15] whilst the second extends the approach by including electrical parameters to weight to the adjacency matrix. Extended topological approaches often made use of the DC approximation, con-180 veniently used to build the adjacency matrix using the grid susceptance matrix [8] . Active power flows have also been used as an alternative weighting factor [15] .
In this work, a new weighting factor based on the line percentage of rating 185 is introduced. The weight is compared to existing weights taken from the literature. Thus, the adjacency matrices will built using 4 different weights for each line l (i.e. 1, B l , f l and P R l ). The first 3 weights are selected based on earlier works while the percentage of rating is selected on the idea that by weighting lines using f l relevant information might be missing. For instance, a line that 190 has a very small f l (e.g. few MW flowing into the lines), can be nonetheless very close to failure (e.g. high P R l ). It is worth remarking that analysis performed using unweighted adjacency matrix or weighted using susceptances have to be regarded as a static analysis (because weights do not change over time). Conversely, using w l = f l or w l = P R l the analysis has to be regarded as dynamic 195 because weights change over time [23] .
Recently, vulnerability metrics obtained from spectral decomposition of W and L have been used to extract indicators of the grid robustness [3] . The metrics considered are: the spectral radius (ρ G ) [26] , the algebraic connectivity (µ 2 ) [8] - [3] , the natural connectivity λ G [27] and effective graph resistance R G [8] . The Spectral radius is the largest eigenvalue of W whilst µ 2 is the second smallest eigenvalue of L. The natural connectivity and the effective graph resistance can be computed as follow:
Extended topological 
where λ i is the i th eigenvalue of W and µ i is the i th eigenvalue of the L and the sum is such that null µ i are neglected. The measure ρ G can be regarded as an indicator of robustness of networks against dynamic processes (e.g. virus 200 spreading, synchronization processes and phase transition behaviours), high µ 2 indicates a highly connected network (difficult to be partitioned into independent components). The natural connectivity quantifies the redundancy of alternative paths by quantifying the weighted number of closed walks of all lengths. The physical meaning is related to the Helmholtz free energy of a network [28] .
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Finally, R G computed using susceptances is the sum of effective resistances R l between all l, the lower it is the higher the network robustness is. The graph spectral radius, the natural connectivity, the algebraic connectivity and the effective graph resistance are computed using the 4 lines weights and used to assess drops in power grids robustness as summarised within Table 1 . The over-210 load cascading index presented in Section 2.1 will be for additional comparison between the metrics.
Treatment of Uncertainty
Uncertainty Characterisation
Given a probability space (Ω, F, P), a random variable X is defined as a map 215 X : ω ∈ Ω → X(ω) ∈ I X ⊂ R, which relates basic events ω in the event space Ω to a value X(ω) included in the random variable support I X , subset of the real line. In classical probability theory, the measure X(ω) is a crisp (precise) value, which is obtained assuming exact knowledge of the underlying probability density function f X (x) (PDF) and related cumulative probability distri-220 bution function F X (x) (CDF). Generally speaking, uncertainty can be divided in aleatory and epistemic [29]- [30] . The aleatory uncertainty (not reducible) explains stochastic behaviours and randomness in events and variables whilst the epistemic uncertainty is commonly related to lack of knowledge, imprecision and poorly designed models and is in theory reducible. In case of incomplete 225 knowledge and lack of sufficient information on X(ω), it is advisable to relax the assumption on precise probabilistic model. This can be done by employing dedicated theories and approaches (e.g. Evidence theory [31] , Imprecise probability [32] , Possibility theory [33] ).
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Probability boxes (P-boxes) are powerful and versatile tools to characterise quantities affected by both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty [32] . P-boxes are strongly connected to Dempster-Shafers theory of evidence [31] - [34] - [35] . Mathematically, a P-box defines upper and lower bounds on CDFs of a random variable, denoted by F X (x) ≤ F X (x) ≤ F X (x) ∀x ∈ I X . The probability boxes 235 can be parametric (or distributional) if the underlying probability distribution family is known (e.g. Gaussian with imprecise mean and variance) or nonparametric (or distribution-free) if the distribution family is not known, e.g. the only information available is on the CDF bounds [29] . Two examples of distribution-free P-boxes are depicted in Fig.1 . The distance between the upper 240 and lower CDFs represents the amount of epistemic uncertainty associated to the vulnerability. It can be observed that the P-box on the right hand is strongly affected by epistemic uncertainty. Conversely, the P-box on the left hand side has a stronger aleatory component and the epistemic uncertainty appear to be less relevant.
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In this work, the sources of uncertainty investigated are:
1) The aleatory uncertainty associated to load demand variability. The aggregated load connected to a node i (P L,i ) can be described by a Normal
, where P L,i is the load demand at node i, µ i is the load mean value and σ i is the standard deviation 250 at node i ∈ N . The parameter of the distribution can be estimated from historical records of load demand per node.
2) Imprecision in the lines parameters (B l ), attributable to design tolerance modelled as intervals (i.e. epistemic uncertain). 3) Uncertainty in the selection of the vulnerability model. Different vulner-255 ability metrics computed using different models (e.g. power-flow model, pure or extended topological models) will be compared and discussed.
Once uncertain inputs are propagated through the computational model, the vulnerability outputs will be characterised by a mixture of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty and described using P-boxes. 
Uncertainty Propagation
Consider a deterministic (computational) vulnerability model M V , is a map from the M-dimensional input space x to the O-dimensional vulnerability output space V. Formally, it is M V :
be treated as a black-box of which only the input and output vectors can be processed. If x is affected by aleatory uncertainty, it will be characterised using appropriate probability distribution function (and corresponding CDF). Once propagated through M V (e.g. using classical Monte Carlo) the output will result in a well-defined CDF. If x is affected by epistemic or mixed aleatory-epistemic 270 uncertainty, P-boxes will be suitable for the characterisation. After uncertainty propagation, the outputs will produce bounds on the vulnerability CDFs (i.e. P-boxes).
A simple example which compares a classical probabilistic method to an 275 advanced uncertainty quantification (UQ) method is depicted in Fig.2 . A vul-nerability measure is computed using the mode M V (sum of A and B), where input A has a well-known aleatory behaviour (e.g. it is distributed as a normal PDF) and the B is a parameter affected by purely epistemic uncertainty (e.g. a tolerance interval). The parameter B does not have a stochastic behaviour, 280 but it is rather imprecisely defined. This is due, for instance, to a limited precision in the available measurements for B. This interval can be narrowed down by providing better instruments for the measurements, i.e. reducing the epistemic uncertainty associated. In order to run a plain MC, uniform distribution is assumed within the interval bounds. Once the probabilistic model is well-defined and uncertainty propagated, the output will have a precise probabilistic description (i.e. a crisp CDF in longdashed line). This might result inappropriate for two main reasons. First, assumptions might be difficult to justify and might produce wrong results. Secondly and perhaps most importantly, the system analysts will be unable to distinguish between the contribution of epis-290 temic uncertainty and aleatory uncertain to the output [32] . Consequently, the analyst will be unable to determine if the output uncertainty is attributable to information deficiency (epistemic problem), that can in theory be reduced, or if is due to randomness and inherent variability (aleatory problem), thus not reducible but just quantifiable. To overcome this limitation, classical probabilistic 295 approaches can be coupled to advanced uncertainty quantification which allows differentiating between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty in the output without introducing assumptions (i.e. uniform random behaviour of a parameter within a tolerance interval) and with weaker or fewer assumptions compared to the classical counterpart. Results are lower and upper bounds on the CDF, in solid 300 and dashed line respectively. The drawback of those methods is the generally higher computational cost [29]-[36] and an imprecise probabilistic description of the output [32] , which is the price to pay for slaking the assumptions on the probabilistic model. Nevertheless, generalised probabilistic frameworks provide a valuable perspective on the result and, being non-intrusive, are applicable to 305 any computational model [29] . P-boxes can propagated using different strategies, examples are the double loop Monte Carlo algorithm or the slicing method [37] . Fig.3 presents graphically the two methods. For the slicing method (or focal element propagation) a total of N s independent samples are directly obtained from the P-box bounds. For each input P-box a so-called 'alpha-cut' α is obtained by sampling from the uniform probability distribution U (0, 1). Then, the bounds of the P-boxes are inverted to obtain the input interval as follows:
The combination of the input intervals corresponds to a Parameter cell which is defined by the hyper-rectangle:
Once the I X is sampled, minimum and maximum vulnerabilities are obtained as
, respectively. The procedure stops when a total of N s hyper-rectangles I X are sampled and empirical upper and lower CDF bounds computed as:
In order to obtain V i and V i , a variety of methods can be used. For instance, bounds can be approximated by sampling within I X , using vertex methods [38] or by global optimisation approaches [29] . In this work, a simple and effective 
Contingencies and Combinatorial Problem
In some power flow applications, contingency analysis is performed to constrain the network to safe operational states, for instance, by means of Security failures is generally selected from the full set of combinations, the one considered more likely and with higher consequences. Higher order contingencies are often forsaken by assuming a negligible probability of facing those events, too low to be relevant. Nevertheless, targeted malicious attacks, extreme weather induced failures and other common cause failure mechanisms have the potential to in-crease the likelihood of face severe N − k contingencies [39] and have generally higher consequences for the system. In this paper, the complete set of N − 1 single line failure are analysed and the most severe are identified using different vulnerability metrics. Random N − k contingencies are also analysed and for increasing damage size k. The most threatening events will be ranked and the 345 average network vulnerability for increasing k discussed. Relevant sources of uncertainty have been accounted in all the phases of the calculation.
The Proposed Framework
Algorithms (designed by the authors) are presented here and will be used to analyse the power grid under N − 1 and N − k line contingency scenarios.
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These will be later coupled to advanced, non-intrusive, uncertainty quantification approaches. Algorithm 1 is used for the N −1 contingency analysis. First, a power grid case study is loaded (e.g. a MATPOWER 'Case' [40] ) and additional input provided. A pre-contingency power flow (AC or DC) is solved and lines flows f l and rating P R l are obtained for the undamaged network. The weights 355 w l are selected, the undamaged adjacency and Laplacian matrices (W und and L und ) obtained and used to compute vulnerability as explained in Sections 2.2 and 3. Single-line failures are evaluated one-at-a-time, either using 'Power-Flow Analysis' and 'Topological Analysis' methods. The 'Power-Flow Analysis' method works as follows: 360 1) Removed the line l from the undamaged network structure.
2) Compute post-failure f l and P R l using the post-contingency power flow presented in Algorithm 2 which is summarised by steps (3-5).
3) Run the depth-first-search algorithm to find the connected components (cc) in the damaged grid. 5) If the network is not fully connected (i.e. cc > 1), the islands G is with a single node are removed (the islanding is assumed unsustainable). For the remaining islands G is , a slack bus is selected among the P-V nodes 370 generator nodes) and the post-contingency f j (C l ) and P R j (C l ) obtained. If the grid island has no generators, the partition is set as isolated (outage).
6) Compute the overload severity and the cascading probability for all survived lines j and the cascading index CEI(C l ) for the failed line l (i.e. the one removed in step 1).
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7) The algorithm steps from 1) to 6) are repeated until all N − 1 line failures are analysed.
Similarly, the 'Topological Analysis' method proceeds as follows:
1) Remove the line l from W und and compute the damaged network L.
2) Compute eigen-proprieties (Φ W und , Φ L und , Ψ, Λ).
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3) Compute the effective graph resistance, the natural connectivity, the spectral radius and the algebraic connectivity as explained in Section 3.1. The method used for the N − k line contingency analysis is summarised in the Algorithm 3. First the network data, the size of the contingency k and the number of contingency scenarios to be analysed N C are selected. Then, k lines are randomly removed from the undamaged network and the consequence are Select w l ∈ {1, B l , f l , P R l } and build W und and L und
4) Evaluate vulnerability to the analysed contingency V(C
6:
Compute & Save ΦW und , ΦL und , Ψ, Λ and M = {ρG, µ2, λ, RG} for each line l ∈ L do 10:
Reset undamaged state and remove line l
11:
Run: Post-Contingency Algorithm 2
12:
Compute Sj(C l ) and P(Cj|C l ) for each line in service j.
13:
Compute CEI(C l ) 14: end for
15: 16:
Topological Analysis
17:
for each line l ∈ L do
18:
Set W = W und and w l = 0, build L
19:
Obtain ΦW , ΦL, Ψ and Λ and M(C l ) = {ρG, µ2, λ, RG}
20:
Compute V(C l ) for each metric Search for connected components (cc) (depth-first-search) 3: if cc > 1 then
4:
Check and remove isolated node
5:
∀ island:
Select one slack among the P-V nodes Input: Load Power Grid 'Case', set k and NC
3:
Run: Pre-contingency AC (or DC) power flow
4:
Select one w l ∈ {1, B l , f l , P R l } and build W und and L und
5:
Compute ΦW und , ΦL und , Ψ, Λ and obtain M = {ρG, µ2, λ, RG} 6: for i = 1 to NC do
7:
Remove k lines randomly and compute L
8:
Obtain ΦW , ΦL, Ψ, Λ and M(C N −k ) = {ρG, µ2, λ, RG}
9:
Compute Vi(C N −k ) for each metric
10:
11:
Compute S l (C N −k ) and P(C l |C N −k ) for each line in service k.
12:
Compute CEIi(C N −k ) and restore undamaged topology 13: end for
14:
Compute CDFs and expectations:
15: 
A Case Study: IEEE 24 node reliability test system
The selected case study is a modified version of the IEEE 24 nodes reliability test system [41] . The grid is realistic, fairly complex and suitable to test the proposed framework. The modified network counts 24 nodes, 17 loads, 34 lines 
Results: N-1 line failures
The N −1 line failures are analysed using the Algorithm 1 and using 'PowerFlow Analysis' and 'Topological Analysis' methods as presented in Section 5. The vulnerability results obtained using 'Topological Analysis' method are dis-420 played in Fig.5 . The Y-axis display relative changes in spectral vulnerability metrics due to failure of the line l, i.e. V(C l ). Each line is identified by an identification number (ID) and displayed on the X-axis. On the right hand side left-hand-side in the bottom and top panels, respectively. Red solid lines are obtained using pure topological analysis (w l = 1), the bars are obtained weighting adjacency with susceptances (w l = B l ), the black dashed lines using the line active flows (w l = f l ) and the green marked lines using percentage of rating (w l = P R l ).
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The analysis is performed very efficiently and the 5 most vulnerable lines are ranked in approximatively 0.15 seconds (which is the overall time for all the metrics and weights). The ranking results are presented in Table 2 Table 3 . The DC results are quite similar the AC results, although the DC approximation overestimates slightly some of the line flows. This is probably due to the errors introduced by the DC approximation when the network is in contignency state (e.g. for higher system 445 stress, possibly higher losses and larger voltage angles [42] ). Furthermore for the selected MATPOWER case, the PV nodes have voltage magnitudes greater than Comparison between four spectral metrics (µ 2 , ρ G , λ G , R G ) and different adjacency matrix weights (w l ∈ {1, B l , f l , P R l }). 
Correlation analysis
An analysis of rank correlations is proposed to assess similarities and differences between the vulnerability metrics. The Spearman's correlation coefficient is a non-parametric measure of rank correlation and it can be used to mea-465 sure the statistical dependence between metrics. It is sometimes defined as the Pearson correlation coefficient between ranked variables [43] . The matrix of Spearman's rank correlation coefficients is calculated for 2 CEI indices ( computed using the AC and DC methods) and for 16 spectral graph metrics (the 4 metrics and 4 weights for each metric). Table 4 
presents the correlation results
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calculated from the ranking of the 10 most vulnerable lines. Figure 6 displays graphically the correlation matrix. It can be observed, as expected, a very high positive correlation between the AC and DC cascading indices (close to 0.8). It can be also observed high/moderate correlations (from 0.6 to 0.9) between the same spectral vulnerability metric but computed with different weights. Alge-475 braic connectivity and effective resistance are also highly correlated, which can be explained as both are computed using the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix. Many pairs of vulnerability metrics are weakly correlated (i.e. coefficients <0.3). However, other metrics display a high degree of correlation (i.e. coefficients between 0.6 and 0.9) or a moderate degree of correlation (i.e. coefficients between 0.3 and 0.6).
Uncertainty Quantification
The aleatory uncertainty in the power demand is propagated to the cascading index and to the extended topological metrics using the MC method. For 485 each MC run, a random realisation of the load profile is obtained (i.e. a vector containing 17 random loads P L,i ) and forwarded to the N − 1 solver (Algorithm 1). The network vulnerability is then evaluated using cascading indices computed with the AC and DC power flow methods. Spectral metrics are computed using 2 different weights for the line (f ij and P R ij ). The results for the 490 remaining weights (w ij = 1 and w ij = B ij ) are not affect by load variability and thus neglected here. The Monte Carlo method stops when a predefined number of realisations is reached (set to 500). ers are the vulnerability realisations of the MC method (i.e. CEI and V for each line and for each load demand sample). A 2-sigma rule has been used to robustly rank the 5 most vulnerable lines under uncertainty the results are 500 compared to the deterministic case. Using of a 2-sigma rule means that the rank is based on the upper tail of the vulnerability distribution (i.e. the value selected for the ranking includes 97.73% of the vulnerability realisations if assumed normally distributed). The result significantly changes if compared to the deterministic results presented in Table 3 . Table 6 shows the results for the the time needed to perform the Topological Analysis method was significantly lower, just 68 seconds were needed (i.e. about 17 seconds for each line weight).
The effect of parameter imprecision on the vulnerability result is also assessed. Sources epistemic uncertainty considered are: 10 % imprecision inter-515 vals on the 34 lines susceptances, which are attributable to design tolerances. Both the imprecision on B l and the aleatory uncertainty in the load profile are propagated using a double loop MC approach and without mixing aleatory and epistemic components. Previous analysis suggested that the metrics adopted to assess the vulnerability of the power grid G vary monotonically with respect 520 the imprecise parameters B l . Thus, the upper and lower bounds on the CDFs can be efficiently approximated by random search within the vertex boundaries of the hyper-rectangle I X = [0.95B 1 , : An example of output P-boxes obtained using advanced UQ methods. The vulnerability is greatly affected by aleatory uncertainty, but also epistemic uncertainty plays a role (metrics computed for w ij = P R ij ).
500 load realisations. The vulnerability is obtained as a P-box and an example is depicted in Fig.9 which presents 4 CDF envelopes (i.e. P-boxes) for the 4 considered metrics and weight w ij = P R ij . For sake of synthesis, only vulnerability scores due to failure of l 11−14 are plotted (other lines produces analogous results). In can be noticed that the aleatory component is dominating the uncer-530 tainty associated to the spectral vulnerability metrics. The effect of parameters imprecision has been quantified and it resulted small but observable. Same uncertainty sources have been propagated on the cascading index CEI solving the network using the DC power flow method. The P-boxes of CEI and for two of the most vulnerable lines have been reported in Fig.10 . Especially for 535 the failure of the line connecting node 15 to node 21 the CEI precision results highly affected by parameter tolerances. This is an interesting result showing that some failure scenarios are more sensitive to a data deficiency, tolerance imprecision and epistemic uncertainty.
Results: N-k line failures
540
Higher order N − k contingencies are analysed using the Algorithm 3 presented in Section 5. The contingency analysis is carried out by increasing damage sizes, i.e. k = 1, .., 8. The random number of failures N C is set equal to 1000 for each damage size k. Fig.11 shows that the average topological vulnerabilities computed weighting adjacency elements by susceptances, which result 545 increasing for increasing k. It is interesting to notice that average drops in spectral radius and the natural connectivity result very similar and that have the lower gradient with respect to the contingency size. Conversely, the mean drop in algebraic connectivity has the higher gradient and for a contingency of type N − 8, it results close to 1. This indicates that it is highly unlikely to face 550 an N − 8 failure which keeps the power grid fully connected (i.e. µ 2 = 0 for the damaged network). Furthermore, the relative drop in algebraic connectivity will be of little use to analyse higher order contingencies (i.e. the vulnerability result will be likely equal to 1). 555 
Discussion
The vulnerability of the IEEE 24 nodes reliability test system has been analysed. Different metrics have been compared in ranking contingencies and the In cr ea si n g k 
Expected Vulnerability
Algebraic Connectivity Effective Resistance Natural Connectivity Spectral Radius Figure 11 : Comparison between the expected vulnerability when facing an N −k contingencies using different spectral metrics. Adjacency built using B ij as weights.
uncertainty due to load demands variability and line parameters imprecision has been quantified.
560
The comparison between pure topological and extended topological approaches shows significant correlation (similarities) between the ranking results. Spectral analysis of the network requires a moderate computational cost for obtaining a full spectrum of eigenvalues and eigenvectors for each contingency; significantly 565 less than the cascading indices. The higher computational complexity is attributable to the (at least two) power flow solutions which have to be computed to obtain the cascading indices. Of course, the larger the network size the higher will be the computational cost for the analysis. Nevertheless, adjacency matrices for real world power network are often sparse matrix and, therefore, dedicated 570 approaches can be used to speed up the procedure when just few eigenvalues are needed, e.g. spectral radius and algebraic connectivity. In this case, the on-line applicability of the spectral vulnerability metric for contingency ranking also accounting uncertainties might be feasible.
575
However, the spectral vulnerability metrics, even if enhanced by electrical engineering concepts, seem unable to fully capture the complexity of the network operation, i.e. major difference has been observed between cascading index results and results using extended topological approaches. Nevertheless, many of the lines which have been ranked using cascading indices resulted in a null con-580 tribution to the vulnerability (due to null post-failure overload severity). This might be regarded as a limitation of the CEI metric which has not been able to fully capture all the relevant consequences of certain line failures.
The uncertainty in vulnerability metrics, due to the load demands variability 585 and lines parameters imprecision (tolerances) has been quantified. This provides a more robust identification of the critical components. The line ranking results under uncertainty differ from the deterministic results, although some of the most critical line contingencies have been similarly identified. Analysing the output P-boxes, it has been observed that the vulnerability computed using 590 spectral vulnerability metrics and power flow as the weighting factor is greatly affected by the stochastic load profile. Also tolerance imprecision (epistemic uncertainty) has a non-negligible effect, although its contribution to the uncertainty seems less significant on spectral vulnerability metrics. Conversely, some of cascading indices show high sensitivity to parameters imprecision.
595
As expected, the uncertainty propagation using advanced uncertainty quantification techniques was very demanding, especially for the power-flow methods. This is a clear limitation of the advanced UQ approach which makes it difficult to apply to on-line analysis. Nevertheless, the method is powerful and versatile 600 and can be effectively used to point out how much of the output uncertainty is reducible by further data collection (i.e. due to lack of information). This can be useful in may ways. For instance, a decision makers can use the method to to determine if a power grid is robust, if it is vulnerable, or if the available information is not sufficient to provide a clear answer to questions relating to the network ability to withstand targeted or random contingencies.
To summarise, select good vulnerability metrics for the identification of relevant contingencies is not an easy task. Among the different metrics considered in this work, pure topological metrics present two relevant features: 1) less 610 information is generally required (only the structure of the grid was needed); 2) uncertainty associated to operative variables (e.g. load demand) and imprecision associated with power grid parameters are not affecting the metrics. These may be regarded as positive features, nonetheless, it might be argued that the pure topological metrics (being less sensitive to variability) are less effective in capturing complex behaviours which are typical of varying operative states in power grids. Although a correlation analysis pointed out some similarity between topological metrics and the cascading indices, their capabilities for contingency ranking prospects are still questionable. Further comparisons between graph-theory methods and traditional approaches are necessary. 
Conclusions
In this paper, a novel framework for assessing power grids vulnerability has been presented. The vulnerability assessment framework is embedded to advanced uncertainty quantification methods used to quantify the level of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty on the results. Single line and multiple line 625 contingencies have been analysed and their vulnerability ranked with respect to topology-based metrics, flow-based metrics and accounting for model imprecision and stochastic loads. Four spectral vulnerability metrics have been computed using four different weighting factors (taken from literature and newly defined) and used to assess the robustness of a modified version of the IEEE 630 24 nodes RTS. Different effects of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty on network operational weaknesses (i.e. AC and DC overflow cascading models) and structural vulnerabilities have been discussed and relevant differences in the contingency ranking have been pointed out. Major differences in ranking results are attributable to the different vulnerability metrics rather than to different 635 line weights. In case that only one vulnerability metric is selected, the choice of metric must be done with a high degree of care and done so whilst accounting for all the relevant sources of uncertainty which may generate misleading results.
